Searching for a clear narrative to guide my understanding of Tunisian current affairs has already, after only a handful of conversations, proved to be a nearly impossible task. Interpretations vary greatly of how far the country has come, how things are likely to progress, and the nature and dynamics of any changes that may (or may not) have already taken place. I've learned that the black and white dynamics of political contestation and social strife one gets from reading English-language news reports about Tunisia really don't seem to hold much water when one talks to the people living this on the ground.
The biggest surprise has been the clear belief of some intelligent and thoughtful people here that ultimately things are no better than under the Ben Ali dictatorship, and likely considerably worse. Sure, you can now say whatever you want and the number of media outlets has exploded in the last two years, but the basic problems remain the same, yet are aggravated by inflation, scarcity, and a lack of investment and tourist dollars. This is not a longing for the return of the old regime, but rather a sense that the fundamental goals of the revolution were not achieved. The revolution was spurred on by youth demanding jobs and dignity, but they are now back home looking for jobs while an entirely different group of people has filled the power vacuum Ben Ali's exit created. Free expressions of faith was never a big problem, according to some, as people would worship however they wished at home in spite of government regulations. Now the ruling party is defined by religion and governing more or less as Ben Ali did, missing the point of the revolution. There is real disappointment, even disgust, at the current government, most of whose members had been in jail or abroad for years, removed from Tunisian society, and now find themselves operating the same institutions left behind by the dictatorship in much the same way. They are seen as seeking merely to consolidate their power and create a political system conducive to their own success, while addressing none of the fundamental problems bogging down the economy. 10 dinars use to last you a week, and now it won't even get you through the day, while the government is going broke. For all his faults, this never happened under Ben Ali. Ennadha is widely disliked by secular Tunisians, but this seems due primarily to their poor performance over the last two years, not their attitude toward religion in society.
The influence of the Salafis is far from clear, although no one I've talked to likes them, and most are quite dismissive of them as a group. Some see at least a small potential for them to derail the process, while others see them as incapable of seriously challenging the fundamentally secular dynamics that drove the revolution. Overall, there doesn't seem to be a great deal of worry about their potential to instigate violence, and the security situation in general seems to be regarded as something that is very much exaggerated in the Western media, whose coverage discourages tourists from visiting and investors from approaching the country. The fact that coverage of violence and dissent was suppressed under the dictatorship means that there now falsely appears to be an escalation of unrest, which is likely untrue.
Civil society was cited by some as a major driver behind the revolution, working underground to eventually unseat the regime, and a key force for progress going forward, but others have focused on how underdeveloped it is and how civil society groups tend to lack any real ideological heft due to decades of restrictions on their operations. Their role over the coming months and years seems quite unclear.
I've only been talking to people here for the last few days, but every conversation I have challenges my preconceptions of the facts of the ground and the dynamics of transition in post-revolution societies. Indeed, I have quickly come to question whether this revolution really succeeded in accomplishing that much at all. While Westerners view freedom of speech as a fundamental pillar of a healthy society, spending time here may illustrate that it alone cannot fix deep-seated economic and social problems in a developing state. Talk is one thing, but it is action that Tunisians now crave.
The biggest surprise has been the clear belief of some intelligent and thoughtful people here that ultimately things are no better than under the Ben Ali dictatorship, and likely considerably worse. Sure, you can now say whatever you want and the number of media outlets has exploded in the last two years, but the basic problems remain the same, yet are aggravated by inflation, scarcity, and a lack of investment and tourist dollars. This is not a longing for the return of the old regime, but rather a sense that the fundamental goals of the revolution were not achieved. The revolution was spurred on by youth demanding jobs and dignity, but they are now back home looking for jobs while an entirely different group of people has filled the power vacuum Ben Ali's exit created. Free expressions of faith was never a big problem, according to some, as people would worship however they wished at home in spite of government regulations. Now the ruling party is defined by religion and governing more or less as Ben Ali did, missing the point of the revolution. There is real disappointment, even disgust, at the current government, most of whose members had been in jail or abroad for years, removed from Tunisian society, and now find themselves operating the same institutions left behind by the dictatorship in much the same way. They are seen as seeking merely to consolidate their power and create a political system conducive to their own success, while addressing none of the fundamental problems bogging down the economy. 10 dinars use to last you a week, and now it won't even get you through the day, while the government is going broke. For all his faults, this never happened under Ben Ali. Ennadha is widely disliked by secular Tunisians, but this seems due primarily to their poor performance over the last two years, not their attitude toward religion in society.
The influence of the Salafis is far from clear, although no one I've talked to likes them, and most are quite dismissive of them as a group. Some see at least a small potential for them to derail the process, while others see them as incapable of seriously challenging the fundamentally secular dynamics that drove the revolution. Overall, there doesn't seem to be a great deal of worry about their potential to instigate violence, and the security situation in general seems to be regarded as something that is very much exaggerated in the Western media, whose coverage discourages tourists from visiting and investors from approaching the country. The fact that coverage of violence and dissent was suppressed under the dictatorship means that there now falsely appears to be an escalation of unrest, which is likely untrue.
Civil society was cited by some as a major driver behind the revolution, working underground to eventually unseat the regime, and a key force for progress going forward, but others have focused on how underdeveloped it is and how civil society groups tend to lack any real ideological heft due to decades of restrictions on their operations. Their role over the coming months and years seems quite unclear.
I've only been talking to people here for the last few days, but every conversation I have challenges my preconceptions of the facts of the ground and the dynamics of transition in post-revolution societies. Indeed, I have quickly come to question whether this revolution really succeeded in accomplishing that much at all. While Westerners view freedom of speech as a fundamental pillar of a healthy society, spending time here may illustrate that it alone cannot fix deep-seated economic and social problems in a developing state. Talk is one thing, but it is action that Tunisians now crave.
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